Eastern DRC: The peace process has yet to reach the mineral routes

The negotiations began after the balance of power had already changed

The present negotiations began only after the balance of power in eastern DRC had already changed. AFC/M23, which re-emerged as an armed force in 2021, took Goma and Bukavu in 2025 and established civilian and security structures across the territory it held. By the end of that year, the movement controlled the largest area held by a Congolese rebellion since the regional wars of the 1990s and early 2000s.

International Crisis Group’s account describes how talks advanced while the movement recruited, rearmed and consolidated its administration.

AFC/M23’s territorial gains limit what another agreement can achieve on its own. The Washington track between the DRC and Rwanda deferred the movement to separate negotiations in Doha; the first Doha framework then left many of the main political and security issues for later protocols.

Negotiators now have to do more than stop the fighting. They have to address an alternative system of authority that already controls important towns, roads, border crossings and mining areas.

The August round gave the process a clearer structure. Representatives of the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August and agreed a sequence for negotiating the remaining protocols under their November 2025 framework. They also endorsed a common method for reporting alleged ceasefire violations and a mechanism for following implementation.

The joint statement gives mediators and observers a record against which to judge conduct, rather than another general promise to pursue peace.

Days later, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus carried out its first field mission in Minembwe with logistical support from MONUSCO. The mission was modest but significant: a ceasefire mechanism that cannot enter contested areas cannot establish an accepted account of events.

Verification can establish where fighting occurred, which forces were present and whether access was obstructed. It cannot decide who governs rebel-held territory, who collects border revenues or how Congolese institutions return. Those questions sit at the centre of the conflict and of the commercial risk attached to minerals and transport routes in the east.

Not all Congolese minerals carry the same risk

Conflict risk in the DRC is often applied too broadly to the country’s entire mining sector. This obscures the distance between large-scale copper and cobalt production in the south and the principal fighting in North and South Kivu. Industrial mines in the south have continued to support growth and exports even as conflict intensified in the east.

The World Bank’s March economic update described mining as the main source of resilient growth in 2025, despite the war and a temporary cobalt export ban.

Southern operations still depend on national policy and infrastructure. Higher security spending can alter the fiscal position; decisions in Kinshasa affect taxes and exports across the sector; and a country-wide reputation for conflict can influence finance and customer policy. Labour, suppliers and transport networks also cross provincial boundaries.

But a copper project in the south does not face the same risks as gold or the so-called 3Ts—tin, tantalum and tungsten—moving through conflict-affected parts of the east.

Buyers therefore need more precise due diligence, not less of it. The relevant chain begins at a mine and continues through traders, roads, checkpoints, borders and processors. Traders can mix or relabel material along the way, and a shipment may carry documents from an authority that another party does not recognise. Visible fighting may subside while coercive taxation and rebel administration continue.

Traceability breaks down when armed groups control the route

The UN Secretary-General reported in April that AFC/M23, with support from the Rwanda Defence Force, had consolidated its control and extended parallel administration after further advances. Fighting involving Congolese forces, AFC/M23 and other armed actors had continued into March. The report describes a conflict involving far more actors than the two parties negotiating in Doha.

A ceasefire between the government and AFC/M23 may reduce their direct confrontation without restraining allied militias or other armed groups. A field-verification team may establish responsibility for an attack without changing who controls a mine or border crossing. For local businesses, whoever controls the road that day can still set the practical rules.

Traceability becomes unreliable when formal authority and actual control no longer match. Documentation has limited value when teams cannot conduct independent visits, local employees fear retaliation or traders can divert material through another route.

A change in authority provides the best test of a sourcing control: does the supplier report it, can the buyer still verify the route and will the buyer quarantine material already in transit?

Three peace processes still need to work together

Doha does not stand alone. Washington has pursued a separate process between Rwanda and the DRC, while the African Union is trying to coordinate a broader regional approach. The AU’s six-month roadmap covers military and security questions, humanitarian access, dialogue with armed groups, regional economic cooperation and natural resources.

Multiple mediators bring leverage and resources, but they also give the parties more room to make commitments in one forum while delaying them in another. Disputes over whether withdrawal, disarmament, political dialogue or economic cooperation comes first can become a reason for inaction.

What matters is whether the three processes agree on the order of implementation and the consequences of non-compliance, not how many meetings they hold.

Regular field missions would provide an early sign of progress. Their geographic reach, the speed of publication and the handling of disputed evidence will reveal whether verification has become an institution or remains a demonstration. Agreed disengagement, fewer coercive checkpoints and a credible transfer from parallel administrations to recognised civilian authority would carry far more weight.

Companies should look for changes on the ground

Mining companies considering new commitments should start with conditions at the site: security and evacuation arrangements, land and community relations, transport links and the reliability of local partners. A stronger national growth outlook cannot answer those local questions. In conflict-affected areas, investment should depend on whether teams can maintain access and assess conditions independently.

Manufacturers and commodity buyers face a more difficult choice than simply staying or leaving. Blanket disengagement can damage legitimate livelihoods and remove the leverage that responsible purchasers have over suppliers. Continuing without reliable evidence, however, risks financing armed actors and accepting documents that conceal the origin of material. Buyers will need to identify which chains remain demonstrable, where additional controls can genuinely work and where purchasing should pause.

Infrastructure and development organisations may face a particularly uncertain transition. Roads and humanitarian routes can reopen before a durable administration takes control. Demand for transport and reconstruction may rise while taxation, land rights and security authority remain disputed. Contracts for this period should set clear assumptions about checkpoints, local partners and access, as well as the conditions that would suspend work.

The talks are more likely to reduce the risk of large offensives than to change territorial control in the near term. Verification may improve warning and establish a record of violations without restoring a normal legal environment. A coordinated disengagement and administrative transition would allow controls to become more specific by location. A breakdown over withdrawal or a disputed attack could just as quickly fragment the process and push trade back towards less transparent routes.

Companies should follow repeated field access, published findings, changes in checkpoint and border control, the treatment of parallel administrations, coordination among the Doha, Washington and AU tracks, and unusual movements along mineral routes.

Diplomatic progress will reduce sourcing risk only when it changes who controls the mines, roads, checkpoints and borders through which the minerals actually move.